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INTRODUCTION 
In its 1994 Communication on the outlines of  an industrial policy for the pharmaceutical sector 
in  the  European  Community  (COM(93)718  of 2  March  1994),  the  Commission  expressed 
concerns that part of  the pharmaceutical industry in  the European Union may be losing global 
competitiveness, with consequent economic and social cost for Europe.  In their responses to 
this  Communication,  both  the  European  Parliament  (Resolution  of 16  April  1996)  and  the 
Council (Resolution of  23  April  1996) have stressed the importance of  completing the internal 
market and establishing a stable and predictable environment in  order to protect the health of 
patients, to ensure rapid access to the market and to encourage therapeutic innovation. 
In the meantime, several of the key actions identified in  the 1994 Communication have been 
accomplished  :  the  new  Community  procedures  for  the  authorisation  and  supervision  of 
medicinal  products  are  fully  operational,  the  ability  to  patent  innovatio.ns  in  the  field  of 
biotechnology has been introduced,  and  some remarkable breakthroughs have been achieved 
in facilitating access to third country markets with the conclusion of  the first phase ofiCH (the 
International  Conference  on  Harmonisation)  and  the  signature  of  mutual  recognition 
agreements with Canada and the United States. 
There  are  encouraging  signs  that  the  action  undertaken  was  necessary.  After  a  late  start, 
Europe's pharmaceutical biotechnology sector is  now growing fast, although not so fast as its 
US counterpart. Employment in  the European industry had been increasing by  an  average of 
2,4 % a year for 20 continuous years, when this trend was abruptly interrupted in  1994 (13,500 
jobs - 2,6% of  total employment - were lost in  that year); since 1996, employment has been is 
growing  but,  by 1997, it had not yet reached the level that had been attained in  1994. 
Further steps are needed.  The purpose of this Communication is  to address the operation of 
the pharmaceutical market in the European Union. It is intended to contribute to- and to take 
forward - policy development in  this  area in  the  light  of recent "Round Table"  discussions 
between the Member States, the pharmaceutical industry and the Commission services on the 
completion of the Single Market in  Pharmaceuticals and of the recent Council Conclusions on 
the operation ofthe Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, agreed in the Internal Market Council in 
May 1998. 
The  completion  of the  internal  market  is  the  single  most  important  step  needed  to  make 
Europe a more attractive R&D investment location, but it is not the only one. Action will  have 
to be taken in  parallel  to address various other factors  shaping the overall  climate in  which 
research  and  innovation  take  place,  such  as  :  access  to  venture  capital;  public  funding  of 
research; programmes to exploit synergies between the academia and industry or between basic 
and  applied  research;  public  understanding  and  acceptance of new  technologies,  including 
biotechnology  and  gene  therapy.  These  matters  are  not  addressed  in  this  Communication, 
which is concentrating on the challenge of  completing the Single Market in pharmaceuticals. 
The purpose of the completion of  the Single Market in  pharmaceuticals is  not just to provide 
an environment which is favourable for pharmaceutical innovation and industrial development, 
it  is  also to improve consumer choices in  pharmaceuticals of the required quality,  safety and 
efficacy,  at affordable cost.  It  must  be clear that these policy orientations have to  lead up to 
improvements in  the provision of healthcare for all  citizens.  This has to be kept in  mind  at  all 
I a...-times, when policies are designed, recommended and  implemented in  this field,  and a difficult 
balance has to be drawn between potentially conflicting objectives. 
Issues relating to pharmaceuticals need also to be seen  in  the wider context of public health 
and  of efforts to modernise and improve health  systems.  With  increasing  pressure on health 
systems,  the Commission  is  already  contributing to  work to  improve their efficiency,  cost-
effectiveness  and  quality.  Details  of this  contribution  are  set  out  in  the  Commission 
Communication  on  modernising  and  improving  social  protection  in  the  European  Union 
COM(97) I  02  ..  The Commission's ongoing work on a future Community public health policy is 
also of particular relevance to the sector.  The first  strand of action  proposed - improving 
information for the development of public  health - aims to provide a  comprehensive health 
information system and infrastructure for policy analysis and development. This could be used 
to examine issues such as patterns for  prescribing pharmaceuticals,  the cost effectiveness of 
both existing and  new pharmaceuticals and  the impact  of other policies on  the sector.  The 
Commission  expects  to  present  concrete  proposals  for  this  new  policy  early  in  1999.  In 
addressing  some  specifics  of the  operation  of the  Single  Market  in  pharmaceuticals,  it  is 
important,  therefore,  to see this  Communication within  the  context of wider work that  the 
Commission is taking forward in this area. 
The efforts undertaken for the completion of the Single Market in  pharmaceuticals must take 
into account the particular features of this sector : a research-based global for-profit industry; 
the traditional functions of demand split between the patient, the prescribing doctor and social 
security  institutions  meeting  most  of the  cost  as  third-party  payers;  little  private  market 
provision; and high consumer expectations that they will  have access to the benefits of medical 
advance  at  affordable  cost.  These  efforts  must  also  be  consistent  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity : Member States have exclusive responsibility in  the field of health care; they view 
both the provision of  health and its financing as keys to social solidarity; and they have to meet 
public expenditure objectives, notably for the purpose of European Monetary Union. 
There is,  however,  added  value  that  action  at  Community  level  can  bring  to the economic 
regulation of the pharmaceutical sector,  particularly in  the context of the Single Market. This 
Communication seeks to set out  the totality of the regulatory, social and industrial interests in 
play,  in  order to ensure that patients and  consumers have access to the pharmaceuticals they 
need  at  affordable  cost  on  the  one  hand  and  that  appropriate  incentives  are  available  for 
innovation and industrial developments on the other. 
The pharmaceutical industry in Europe 
The pharmaceutical industry in  Europe is  a strong industrial sector which makes a  significant 
contribution to Europe's industrial  base.  In  1997,  the trade balance for the European Union 
was some I  OY2  billion ECU in  Europe's favour and over 10 billion ECU was spent in  1997 on 
research and development in  the European Union,  representing a three fold  increase overthe 
previous 1  0  years.  Over 87 billion  ECU worth of products left factories  in  the EU in  1997, 
representing some 40% of global production.  The market value (at ex-factory prices) of the 
European Union  pharmaceutical  market  is  just over 62  billion  ECU Uust  under 30% of the 
world market); its retail value now exceeds 90 billion ECU;  56 billion ECU ofthis retail value 
is accounted for by payments by health care systems.  In  1997, the pharmaceutical industry was 
employing some 487,000 people in  the European Union,  including 71,000 people researching 
and  developing pharmaceuticals.  In  addition to a substantial research and development-based 
2. sector, the pharmaceutical industry in  Europe also  has active sectors dealing in  generic (i.e. 
patent-expired) and non-prescription ("over-the-counter") sectors. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  concerns,  particularly  in  the global  context  in  which  this  industry 
operates. The Commission's 1994 Communication 011  the outlines of  an industrial policy for 
the  pharmaceutical  sector  in  the  European  Community  (COM(93)718  final)  expressed 
concerns that the competitiveness of  the European industry appears to be weakening:  20 years 
ago Europe led the way in pharmaceutical research and development;  more recently,  to judge 
from patent filings at least,  Europe has been overtaken by the US. The trend identified in the 
1994 Communication has been confirmed by the latest data.  Of the 4 7 new active substances 
launched on the World market in  1997,  19 (or 40 %) had been discovered and developed in 
Europe;  30  years  ago,  Europe's  share  of pharmaceutical  discoveries  was  65%.  On  the 
biotechnology side,  Europe has made a particularly poor start compared with progress in the 
United  States,  as  was noted  in  the  1994 Communication.  Figures compiled  in  1995  on the 
invention and  marketing of biotechnology-derived new active substances  put the US share at 
76%, Japan's at  14%,  and  Europe's at  10%.  There are however welcome signs that this is 
starting to change.  Data based on a total of 770 biotechnology-derived medicines (including 
206 genetically engineered ones) under development at the end of 1995  indicate that 25  % of 
the biopharmaceutical development work is currently located in Europe (63% in the US, 7% in 
Japan); in gene therapy specifically, 22% of the development work is located in Europe (70% 
in the US, 1% in Japan). 
The reasons for which part of  the pharmaceutical industry in the European Union appears to be 
losing  global  competitiveness  are  no  doubt  multiple  and  complex.  The  European 
pharmaceutical  industry  registers  significantly  lower  productivity  per  worker  than  its  US 
counterpart.  The  overall  profitability  and  the  return  on  capital  employed  appear  to  be 
significantly higher in the US than in the European Union, although a proper assessment ofthe 
extent  and  nature  of these  differences  faces  formidable  measurement  problems  (because of 
transfer pricing, breakdown between pharmaceutical and other activities,  etc.). The continued 
differences  between  the  European  markets lead  to  excess  costs (such  as  higher  marketing 
costs, higher distribution and  administrative costs) and,  in  some cases,  to excess production 
capacity, that could be off-set by a better operating (single) market. 
The European pharmaceutical market 
There are significant differences between the Member States of the European Union both in 
general  macro-economic conditions (especially  per-capita income  and  wealth)  and  in  health 
systems. At an aggregate level of  income, the majority of  Member States lie within +/- 10% of 
the EU average.  There are,  however, a  few Member States with average incomes per capita 
more significantly below the EU average.  Incomes in  the Applicant countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe are well  below the EU average, and  significantly below any current Member 
States. 
There are  also  marked  variances  in  the  prevalence and  incidence  of major  diseases,  and  -
unsurprisingly - in  the medical  practices and  medical  treatments that address these diseases. 
Health care systems differ  too,  as does the share of health  care expenditure  represented  by 
pharmaceuticals across the Member States.  In  general,  there seems  to be a  well  established 
positive link  between health care expenditure and incomes; however differences in  health care 
expenditure  per  capita  appear  to  be  greater  than  those  in  incomes  per  capita.  Higher 
expenditure on health care as a whole can be related to higher expenditure on pharmaceuticals; 
3. as this relationship is  not perfect, it  suggests that the demand for pharmaceuticals does differ 
across  Member  States.  Further,  the  relationship  between  incomes  and  pharmaceutical 
expenditure appears to be weaker than that between income -and total health care expenditure -
an indication that other factors are important in determining expenditure. 
Pharmaceutical expenditure within the EU is highly skewed towards a limited number of major 
markets.  Hence the two largest  (Germany,  France) account for just over half the total EU 
market, and the largest four (Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom) account for nearly 75% 
of  the total EU market. 
The nature and extent of use of in-patent, out-of-patent and non-prescription medicines varies 
significantly  among  Member  States.  In  particular,  the  use  of generic  products  varies 
considerably between Member States according to how they arrange the financial  incentives 
within their health care systems for the supply, distribution and use of  generics. 
The cost of pharmaceutical distribution,  including wholesale and  retail  pharmacy distribution 
differ  widely  among  Member  States.  Together  with  the  variations  in  the  treatment  of 
pharmaceuticals  under  indirect  taxation  rules,  these  costs  significantly  impact  on 
pharmaceutical budgets. It would seem that considerable savings could be realised by adapting 
distribution channels to pro-competitive and less costly models. 
The pricing of  pharmaceuticals, free movement and parallel  trade 
The  pharmaceutical  market  is  regulated  at  a  number  of levels,  in  particular  through  the 
regulatory mechanisms for the Single Market and through action by Member States at national 
level  to manage  their  health  care  systems.  There is  a  wide  diversity  in  the  ways  in  which 
pharmaceuticals have been  regulated within  the health  care systems in  the different Member 
States  . 
. There are important differences between Member States, both in levels of prices and in levels 
of consumption  (volumes).  These  differences  can  be  explained  l,>y  a  number  of factors, 
including  :  divergent  medical  cultures  and  prescribing  patterns,  price  discrimination  by 
pharmaceutical  companies  to  reflect  the differences  in  the  ability  to  pay,  and  conjunctural 
factors  such  as  inflation  and  currency  fluctuations.  One of the factors  in  these  differences 
appears to be the extent to which Member States rely on price control as  the main means for 
controlling aggregate costs - or whether a wider range of policies are used (including demand 
controls  and  efforts  to  influence  prescribing  patterns).  Because  total  expenditure  on 
pharmaceuticals has both a volume and a price component, relying on price-fixing to control 
expenditure does  not  necessarily  deliver  a  lower  aggregate  spend  on  pharmaceuticals or a 
lower per capita pharmaceutical budget.. 
To  the  extent  that  price  fixing  by  Member  States  results  in  the  establishment  of widely 
divergent prices, conflict can exist  between the operation of price fixing  mechanisms and the 
Single Market.  Wholesale intermediaries buy products in  lower priced parts of the European 
Union and sell  them in  higher-priced parts of the Union.  In  an  effectively integrated market, 
the prices of  tradable goods tend to converge towards a situation where arbitrage is no longer 
an issue;  in  this sector,  since maximum  prices are fixed  in  many Member States,  the price 
convergence pressure on products already in  the market will be towards lower prices, at least 
for out-of-patent products.  Unless parallel trade can operate dynamically on prices,  it creates 
inefficiencies because most,  but not all,  of the financial  benefit accrues to the parallel trader 
rather than to the health care system or patient. However, parallel trade must equally be seen 
4. as an important driving force for market integration and, consequently, for achieving the Single 
Market. In as far as the market structure does not provide for the financial benefits of parallel 
trade  to  be  passed  on  to  consumers  and  taxpayers,  this  can  normally  be  ensured  through 
adequate national measures. 
Parallel trade has also, to an important extent, been stimulated by price differentials created by 
currency fluctuations. European Monetary Union is therefore an important step in reducing the 
risk  of price  distortions.  For  those  Member  States  that  participate  in  the  Euro,  currency 
movements after market launch, and the considerable effect that these fluctuations have had on 
parallel trade, will be a thing ofthe past. 
Legal  context 
Concern about the interaction between European and  national  regulation  of this  sector (and 
parallel  trade  in  pharmaceuticals)  is  not  new.  There  have  been  a  number  of cases  in  the 
European  Court  of Justice  seeking  to  establish  whether  price  fixing  by  Member  States  is 
compatible with the free  movement  of goods in  the European Union.  The Court has  noted 
that  price  control  systems,  although  not  in  themselves  contrary  to  the  principle  of free 
movement of  goods,  may nevertheless be so when the prices are fixed  at a level such that the 
sale  of imported  products becomes either impossible or more difficult  than  that of domestic 
products - see  in  particular  the judgement  in  Roussel (case  C-181182).  In  its  most  recent 
statement  on  these  issues,  in  the judgement  in  Merck  v Primecrown  (cases  C-267/95  and  C-
268/95),  the Court noted that "distortions caused by different price legislation  in  a Member State 
must be  remedied  by  measures  taken  by  the  Community  authorities  and  not  by  the  adoption  by 
another Member State of  measures incompatible with the rules on free movement of  goods". In this 
judgement,  the Court of Justice  also  confinned that  a patent  holder  may  not  impede the parallel 
importation of  his own products from a Member State where the product could not be protected by 
a patent,  unless  he  can  prove  that  he  is  under  a genuine,  existing  legal  obligation  to  market  the 
product in that Member State. 
In  a recent judgement  (Decker  v Caisse  de  maladie des employes prives,  case  C1 20195)  about 
consumers moving across borders to access health care products, the Court has noted that "aims of 
a purely economic nature cannot justifY a barrier to the fundamental principle of  the free movement 
of goods",  going  on  to  note,  however,  that  "it  cannot  be  excluded  that  the  risk  of seriously 
undennining the financial balance of  the social security system may constitute an over-riding reason 
in the general interest capable of  justifYing a barrier of  that kind". Taken together, these judgements 
indicate firstly  that  the fact  that  phannaceuticals are used  within  the  health care systems does not 
exempt them  from  the  rules  of the Single Market  and  secondly that companies nonnally exhaust 
their intellectual property rights at the time when they willingly place products onto any part of  the 
phannaceutical market within the European Union .. 
Progress towards a Single Market in Pharmaceuticals 
Over the past thirty years, there have been a range of  developments towards a Single Market in 
pharmaceuticals,  focusing  on  a  number  of relevant  policy  areas,  in  particular  medicines 
licensing  and  the  protection of intellectual  property.  The coming  into  force of the  European 
Monetary  Union  will  contribute  to  consolidating  these  developments,  whilst  the  recent 
5. successes in the external trade policy will allo,w European companies to use the Single Market 
as a springboard from which to launch into new third country markets. 
•  Medicines licensing 
Since the 19605,  a comprehensive process for ensuring the safety,  quality and efficacy of 
pharmaceuticals delivered to the European market has been developed.  The provisions 
applicable include a  core set  of binding legislation  and  comprehensive  guidance to the 
competent authorities and the regulated  industry.  These texts are brought together in  a 
series  of volumes  entitled  The  Rules  governing  medicinal products  in  the  European 
Union,  which  have  recently  been  made  available  on  the  Internet 
(http://dg3 .eudra.orgleudralex/index.htm).  Current  legislative  developments  include  a 
proposal  for  a  Directive  on  clinical  trials  and  a  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  orphan 
medicinal  products.  Work is  in  hand  to prepare  a  Proposal for  a  Directive on starting 
materials and to codify the entire pharmaceutical legislation in one single text. 
In 1995 two new Community procedures where established which now offer fast access to 
the whole of  the European market in  a single process. relying either on a common central 
evaluation  by  the  European  Medicines  Evaluation  Agency  (EMEA)  or  on  mutual 
recognition between Member States.  The close collaboration between the Member States, 
the EMEA and the Commission that is  a key  factor  in  the  success of this  new system. 
Through the appropriate use of new information technologies and the pooling of the best 
available expertise provided by the National Agencies, this new system - perhaps the first 
example of an  effective "networking administration" - is  already setting the international 
benchmark  for  pharmaceutical  evaluation  and  monitoring  (pharmacovigilance).  A 
comprehensive evaluation of  the operation of  the new system will be conducted in the year 
2000; this will  in  particular provide an  opportunity to address the need to speed up the 
decision-making process and to assess the overall  contribution of the new procedures to 
the improvement of public health in the Community. 
•  Intellectual  proper~v 
On  the  intellectual  property side,  Europe now  has  - through  legislation  that  has  been 
agreed by the Community institutions - the highest quality provisions for pharmaceuticals 
in the world. To compensate for the fact that it takes a long time to research and develop a 
new  product,  the  pharmaceutical  sector  has  been  granted  (through  supplementary 
protection certificates) the right  to extend  its  market  exclusivity beyond  the normal 20-
year  patent  period,  up  to  15  years  of effective  protection  from  the  date  of first 
authorization in the Community (in the US,  the comparable protection is  for a maximum 
of 14 years). Legislation agreed this year by the Community institutions has introduced the 
ability to patent innovations in  the field  of biotechnology, a key field  for this sector.  The 
licensing  process further  protects the  data used  for  license  applications  for 6,  or more 
generally  10,  years  (whereas  in  the  US,  for  example,  such  data exclusivity  lasts  for  a 
maximum of 5 years). The Commission will  present next year a proposal for a regulation 
to establish a Community patent, valid throughout the Single Market; this should facilitate 
the penetration of  market by patented products, because of  streamlined procedures. 
•  European Monetary Union 
A large part of price divergence  in  Europe,  and  more  specifically of price instability,  is 
attributable  to  currency  fluctuations.  Depreciation  of some  currencies  has  widened  the 
6. market  price gap between  some Member States,  creating further  incentives for  parallel 
trade. The advent of the Euro should help to provide a more stable environment in  this 
respect,  at  least  for  participating  Member  States.  It will  however  also  make  price 
differentials  in  the  existing  European  market  much  more  visible;  this  could  in  tum 
stimulate wholesalers and  individual  pharmacists to engage in  cross border business.  On 
the supply side,  the development of an  integrated capital market could reduce costs and 
improve access to funds, especially for innovative SMEs. 
•  Access to third country markets 
Technical requirements for the demonstration of the quality,  safety and efficacy of a new 
medicinal  products  have  been  almost  completely  harmonised  between  the  European 
Union,  Japan  and  the  United  States,  under  the  ICH  (International  Conference  on 
Harmonisation). At the Fourth ICH Conference which took place in Brussels in July 1997 
it  was therefore decided that the three regions would now seek to agree in the way this 
information should be presented for  the purpose of obtaining authorisation to place the 
medicinal product on the market; this would obviously save unnecessary duplication and 
re-working, thus decreasing the time and resources required for submission of regulatory 
documents, ultimately benefiting patients in the three regions and in the rest of  the World. 
In the area of manufacturing, Mutual Recognition Agreements have been concluded with 
Canada, the United States, Australia and New-Zealand; they will allow substantial savings 
for  manufacturers  and,  ultimately,  for  consumers  and  social  security  institutions,  as 
inspections and batch controls are no longer duplicated with no benefit in terms of  quality 
or safety. Similar arrangements are currently being negotiated with Switzerland and Japan. 
The effort  will  henceforth  concentrate  o:t  the implementation  of these  agreements,  on 
resolving  the  remaining  trade  barriers  with  some  of the  major  partners  (such  as  the 
problem  of the  acceptance of foreign  data  in  Japan),  and  on  improving  access  to the 
emerging markets ofEast Asia and Latin America. 
The uncompleted agenda 
As already indicated, there are several areas which deserve further attention : improving access 
to  risk  capital,  especially  for  start up  companies;  providing  better  links  between  basic  and 
applied research; monitoring the trend for large companies to link up or merge; eliminating the 
remaining barriers to entry in the main third country markets.  But the operation of the Single 
Market in  pharmaceuticals remains the single most important of the uncompleted parts of the 
agenda for establishing the European Union as a firm  base for pharmaceutical innovation and 
sustainable industrial development. 
Whilst  it  is  clear that the responsibility for the funding.  management and  organisation of the 
health care systems is one that is firmly within Member State competence, there are aspects to 
the  operation  of these  systems  that  relate  to  a  wider  European  Union  agenda,  notably  in 
respect of the contribution that free  movement of goods makes towards the creation of the 
Single Market. 
Of wider relevance still  is  an industrial policy concern that some of the mechanisms by which 
the  financial  viability  of the  health  care  systems  is  assured  may  unnecessarily  distort  the 
operation ofthe market leading to a reduction in the competitiveness ofthis sector in  a global 
context.  The  key  remaining  issues  relating  to  the  completion  of the  Single  Market  in 
pharmaceuticals are thus largely ones within Member States' competence. Member States and 
7. the  Commission  have  a primary  concern  with  the  improvement  of public  health  and  with 
ensuring that patients and  consumers have wide access to pharmaceuticals at affordable cost; 
these  priorities  have  in  turn  to  be  reconciled  with  public  expenditure  objectives.  Measures 
adopted  for  the  completion  of the  Single  Market  must  therefore  be  consistent  with  the 
principle of subsidiarity.  Solutions will  be found  largely within  the  health care systems which 
are - and are set to remain - widely divergent. 
The Frankfurt Round Tables 
In  order,  therefore,  to  initiate a tripartite dialogue  about  solutions  between Member  States, 
industrial  interests  and  the  Commission,  Commissioner  Bangemann  convened  the  Frankfurt 
Round Tables on the Completion of  the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals. 
The first Round Table took place in December 1996; the second a year later.  A wide range of 
interested  parties  have  attended  these  events,  including  representatives  from  the  Member 
States,  the  European  Parliament,  the  full  range  of industrial  interests  both  within  the 
pharmaceutical industry and in related sectors such as the wholesalers. 
The proceedings of the Round  Tables - and  the reports of two  Working Groups that  met  in 
1997 to prepare the second Round Table discussions - have been published,  and  are available 
on the Internet (http://dg3.eudra.org/frankf/index.htm). 
Whilst  not  necessarily  reflecting  the  views  of Community  institutions,  the  Frankfurt  Round 
Table process has  identified that there are a range of pressures that are growing in this sector 
and that act as factors towards change.  These are in particular: 
•  The  amount  of money  that  Member  States are  spending  on  health  care  in  general  (and 
pharmaceuticals in particular) has been rising at a rate that is faster than the growth in their 
economies.  At  the  same  time,  most  Member  State governments have  been  seeking to 
restrain  government  expenditure  to  meet  the  requirements  for  entry  into  European 
Monetary  Union.  The  need  for  such  fiscal  discipline  will  continue  with  the  Euro. 
Relaxation  of price  controls - particularly  on  in-patent  products  in  countries  with  high 
volume  consumption  could  create  difficulties  in  controlling  aggregate  expenditure  on 
pharmaceuticals. 
•  The product pipelines of the research-based industry are delivering a steady stream of new 
products  into  the  market.  The  recent  Council  Conclusions  on  the  Single  Market  in 
Pharmaceuticals,  agreed at the Internal Market Council  in May  1998, note that the prices 
of  new  pharmaceuticals  should  be  related  to  "the·  therapeutic  interest  and  cost 
effectiveness" of the specific innovation.  Nevertheless, the available means of determining 
the  "value-added"  of  a  specific  new  product,  particularly  at  market  launch,  are 
acknowledged  to  be  relatively  unsophisticated  and  demonstrate  the  usefulness  of 
developing such mechanisms further in the near future. 
•  There are observable delays in  new products reaching some parts of the European market 
after they have received marketing authorization; the pharmaceutical industry has recently 
claimed that products are entering certain parts of  the European market up to 3 years after 
other parts.  The reasons for these delays are unclear (although they may in  part be found 
in the increasing amount of negotiation about pharmaceutical expenditure) and are hard to 
explain  in  the  light  of the specifications  in  the  Transparency Directive (Council  Directive 
89/ I  05/CEE of  21  December 1989) that pricing and reimbursement decisions should take a 
maximum of 180 days.  A re-evaluation of  the content of  this Directive - which was always 
8. intended  as a  provisional  measure  - may  be  becoming  timely  so  that  it  can  take  into 
account new developments in this field. 
•  There are concerns expressed in  some industry circles that the returns for new,  patented 
products in  Europe are  starting to look comparatively unattractive  in  a  global  context. 
Conversely,  the Member States are concerned that,  unless savings can be made elsewhere 
within  existing  expenditure in  the  pharmaceutical  sector or elsewhere  in  the healthcare 
system.  the entry of new products onto the market represents additional calls on health 
budgets. 
•  The forthcoming  enlargement  of the  European  Union  brings  with  it  the  prospect  of a 
considerably  larger  market  for  pharmaceuticals  - and  the  potential  for  a  considerably 
increased generics industry.  However.  the average per capita income in  the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe is considerably lower than the average in the current Member 
States and raises therefore the question of how patients are to have access to affordable 
pharmaceuticals at prices which are realistic in the Single Market context: 
The Council's Conclusions 
In response to the Round Table discussions, and as a contribution to the process,  the Council 
considered  the  Single  Market  in  Pharmaceuticals  in  Conclusions  that  were  agreed  in  the 
Internal  Market  Council  on  18
111  May  1998.  This  was  the  first  time  that  the  Council  has 
discussed the tensions at the heart ofthe Single Market in  Pharmaceuticals.  In its Conclusions, 
the Council invites the Commission to bring forward  a  Communication on these issues,  but 
stresses the importance of "maintaining the established competencies between Member States 
and  the  Commission  in  particular with  respect  to ensuring the availability of health  care to 
citizens  and  improving  the  effectiveness  of the  single  market.  The  Council  considers  that 
Community policy should address the need to: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ensure  the  effective  further  improvement  in  the  operation of the  Single  Market  in  this 
sector based on the principles of  free movement and competition; 
facilitate the delivery of health care in  Member States at levels which are affordable and in 
ways which maximise as far as possible. patient access to medicines; 
recognise Member States' need to adopt economic measures to control the total costs of 
pharmaceutical expenditure; 
maintain the regulation  n of the  pharmaceutical  sector to ensure the safety,  quality  and 
etlicacy of  medicines; and 
strengthen the competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical  industry,  in  particular by 
encouraging research and development which is  required for therapeutic improvement and 
cost-effectiveness." 
The Council considers "that the development of the single market requires Member States to 
take account of  European Union dimensions". It therefore invited "the Commission to address 
in  its Communication how best to accommodate the requirements set out ( ... ) above in  ways 
consistent  with  Community  rules".  The  Council  further  considers  "that  developments  in 
Community  policy  should  take  account,  in  particular.  of tensions  regarding  pharmaceutical 
prices  and  their convergence.  and  the  divergent  patterns of wealth  in  the  Union,  which  are 
likely to increase with enlargement." 
9. Chapter 2 
APPROACHES AND SPECIFIC MEASURES 
The tensions identified in  the Round Table process do not lend themselves to easy solutions. 
In particular, Member State health care systems (for which the Member States are - and will 
remain- responsible) are widely divergent, both in their operation and in their proximity to the 
market. 
The Round Tables have identified that one of the drivers of this discussion is the concern on 
the part of the industry about parallel trade. The Round Table dialogue has  suggested that - in 
the out-of-patent sector- parallel trade can have positive effects for consumers and national health 
care systems by promoting price competition and thereby reducing prices.  At the same time,  it  is 
reasonable to assume that parallel trade has a dynamic restraining effect, particularly on prices at the 
higher end of  the European market;  by contributing,  therefore,  to price competition for in-patent 
products,  it  can  help  social  security  systems  to deal  with  the  strong  market  power of certain 
products.  Where parallel  trade arises because of distortions caused  by  different  price legislation, 
then the Court has indicated,  in the Merck v Primecrown judgement,  that remedies must be found 
by the Community authorities.  These remedies must  be consistent  with  the  basic principle of 
market integration and can therefore not include measures the effect of which is to maintain or 
increase the partitioning of the Common Market along national lines.  Consequently, solutions 
must be found which are compatible with the principles of the Single Market, rather than ones 
which would delay its completion. 
Possible approaches 
The  Commission  has  considered  various  approaches,  including  the  possibility  that  the  current 
situation could be left to develop (Status-quo), a fully  integrated approach (Full integration). and a 
middle  way consisting  in  developing  the co-operation  between  Member  States and  introducing 
nonnal  market  mechanisms  in  market  segments  which  are  sufficiently  suitable  for  convergence 
(Staged introduction ofmarket mechanisms). 
•  Status-quo 
If the current situation is simply left to develop, there is a distinct risk that this could result in a 
long-term  segmentation  of the  Community  pharmaceutical  market,  requiring  important 
monitoring  activities  on  the  part of the  Commission  to  observe  price  differentials  (through 
benchmarking), to take action in  rt!spect of established breaches of the EC Treaty and of the 
Transparency Directive by Member States, and to  continue to apply the competition rules to 
companies seeking to limit  parallel  trade.  Whilst  it  must be acknowledged that the current 
situation has allowed the European Union to ensure a high  level  of social  protection and of 
health protection to its population, it  is  unlikely that simply allowing this situation to develop 
will  suffice to restore the global competitiveness of  the European pharmaceutical industl)' and 
doubtful whether such monitoring activities are, in themselves, the simplest way to achieve the 
proper functioning of  the Single Market. 
•  Full integration 
A  fully  integrated approach would  seek  to relieve the current tensions by forcing  price 
convergence  within  the  Single  Market.  This  would  probably  require  a  centralised 
10. European pricing procedure or, at least, very efficient co-operation between the Member 
States. Irrespective of  whether this would be compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, 
it  must be stressed that establishing an appropriate level  of price across the Community 
would  prove  extremely  difficult.  Low  levels  would  benefit  immediate  health  care 
expenditure objectives (at least in the Member States where prices are currently high), but 
would  provoke a  steady  diminution  of Europe's contribution  to global  pharmaceutical 
R&D investment, leading ultimately to disinvestment from  the European economy.  High 
levels would reduce access to consumers and payers in  those countries where economic 
and social conditions mean that such prices cannot be afforded. 
•  Middle way 
The Round Table process has identified an approach to the regulation of this sector which 
distinguishes between the different sectors of  the market, notably the market for medicines 
which are available without prescription; the out-of-patent sector; and the in-patent sector 
when  the  investment  in  research  and  development  needs  to  be  paid.  for.  Within  this 
framework, there are a number of possible options which Member States may wish to use 
in  order to relieve the tensions that are growing in  this sector.  These measures, some of 
which  are  outlined  in  the  following  section,  aim  at  introducing  convergence  through 
sustained co-operation between Member States and  health care services providers.  They 
also consist in building in normal market mechanisms  whenever they can be left to operate 
without compromising the access to medicines at  an  affordable cost for all  patients and 
consumers,  and  the  Member  States'  ability  to  meet  public  expenditure  objectives.  The 
common  features  of these  measures  is  their  reliance  on  market  transparency,  open 
competition and patient empowerment 
The Commission concurs with the conclusions of  the Second Frankfurt Round Table and with 
the  Internal  Market  Council's  Conclusions  of 18  May  1998  that  a  centrally  administered 
European pricing system for medicines is  undesirable and, currently, impracticable Therefore, 
as  suggested  at  the  Round  Table  and  as  recommended  by  the  Council,  the  Commission 
considers that there is a potential for advancing the Single Market in ways which recognise the 
differing  patterns  and  pace  of development  in  different  segments  of the  market  (non-
prescription, out-of-patent, and  in-patent), through the staged introduction of normal  market 
mechanisms whenever they can be implemented without compromising the access to medicines 
at an affordable cost for patients and consumers, and the Member States' ability to meet public 
expenditure and health care objectives, while fully  recognizing the benefits of  the Treaty rules 
on free movement of  goods in all these segments  .. 
The implications of enlargement should also be considered.  Such a balanced approach would 
however facilitate the preparation of enlargement in  the pharmaceutical  sector, both from  an 
economic and public health point of  view. 
Specific measures 
The  specific  measures  described  here  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  nor  do  they  represent  a 
"blueprint" that might be imposed onto the health care systems in the different Member States. 
Rather. they represent a series of options and devices from which better, less distorting, ways 
of meeting the range of objectives sought in this sector can be developed.  Many of the more 
challenging measures are not implementable "over-night" and  will  take some time to develop 
11. and operate effectively.  All  these  possibilities  need  also  to be considered  in  the context of 
wider efforts to improve the efficiency, quality and cost-effectiveness of health care systems in 
the Member States; indeed without such developments, some of  these possibilities, pursued in 
isolation,  risk bringing significant drawbacks both to the sound management of health care 
systems and to patien.t and consumers access to pharmaceuticals at an affordable cost.  Most of 
the options discussed below are under the exclusive competence of Member States and it is 
therefore, in  accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,  for them to consider whether and 
when some of  these measures could be introduced within their national health system. 
•  Relaxation of  price controls and the development of  effective competition 
As the Council  pointed out in  its Conclusions of 18  May 1998,  there is  a  potential for 
advancing the Single Market in  ways which recognize the differing patterns and  pace of 
development in  different  sub-sectors of the  pharmaceutical market  : products which are 
available  to  patients  without  medical  prescription  (and  for  which  reimbursement  is, 
normally, not available), out-of-patent products (for which generic competition is possible) 
and in-patent products (in principle, these include the most innovative products). 
Non-prescription products 
The  remaining  price  controls  on  pharmaceuticals  sold  without  prescnptton  could  be 
removed,  subject to appropriate accompanying  measures to take into  account  differing 
therapeutic, economic and social circumstances of  patients and their need to access a wide 
range of medicines. Consideration could also be given to accompanying measures aiming 
at reinforcing competition in  this sector, such as the abolition of resale price maintenance, 
the relaxation of restrictions  on the place of sale of non-prescription medicines and  the 
relaxation  of  restrictions  on  the  use  of brand  names  for  products  switched  from 
prescription-only  to  non-prescription.  Such  a  relaxation,  assuming  that  the  market  is 
competitive, could reduce marketing costs considerably by allowing companies to benefit 
from the economies of  scale and scope that could come from cross-border marketing. 
Out-of  patent products 
From an economic point of view, out-of-patent products are far closer than in-patent ones 
to  products  in  normal  markets,  in  which  cost-containment  can  normally  be  achieved 
through price competition.  Consideration  could  be  given  to the  possibility of removing 
price control in  this sector whilst  stimulating competitive arrangements for the supply of 
generic products (see below).  Clearly,  the removal of price controls in  this sector would 
require high levels of  transparency of  information about products. 
In-patent products 
In this sector of the pharmaceutical market, the evidence suggests that greater reliance on 
market mechanisms,  and  greater levels of price freedom for in-patent products available 
under  health  care  systems,  would  require  mechanisms  of market  competition  able  to 
ensure that Member State aggregate expenditure targets are met.  Where specific products 
have few or no therapeutic alternatives, they are likely to have considerable market power. 
This  is  likely  to  influence  the  extent  to  which  liberalization  can  be  achieved  without 
negative  impact  for  patients  and  health  care  systems:  liberalization  can be expected to 
require  much  higher  levels  of price  sensitivity  on  the  part  of prescribers  and  careful 
attention  to  budgeting.  This  would  therefore  require  an  examination  of the  financial 
incentives  within  the  health  care  systems  and,  in  particular,  whether  these  incentives 
12. increase competition or erode it,  and the scope for developing greater price sensitivity on 
the part of  prescribers and greater levels of price competition between products within the 
market. Two key points should be noted in this context. 
Firstly, the removal of mechanisms for setting prices should not be considered as a "prior 
requirement" for developing greater competition within this sector.  Whilst it is clearly the 
case that this industry competes strongly on innovation, and there are indications that price 
competition may  be  an  increasing  factor  in  the  context  of pricing  decisions  at  market 
launch, there is relatively little dynamic price competition in this sector once a product has 
been launched onto the market,.  Without such dynamic competition and in a market with 
little  transparency,  there  is  a  risk  - and  some  anecdotal  evidence  in  the  case  of this 
industry - that "market" pricing simply equates to higher  prices where the health  care 
system pays for brand image  There is  scope for developing further the assessment of the 
relative effectiveness of healthcare interventions - often the information that is  necessary 
to do this can only be generated once products are in  more general use within healthcare 
systems. 
Secondly:  Although intellectual property rights legitimately prevent competitor products 
from  entering  the  market  during  the  patent  period,  they  do  not  somehow  "protect" 
products - even those still  under patent  - from  mechanisms that might be developed to 
encourage price competition between products that are legally placed on the market. 
A  sustainable solution for the longer term  may need not only to reduce the reliance on 
price  fixing  as  the means of meeting budgetary objectives but  also  to  introduce higher 
levels of  competition into the market to free up resources to help to pay for new products. 
Allowing for greater price freedom  in  this  sector needs to take into  account a  range of 
legitimate objectives, including : that Member States need to be able to control how much 
is  spent in  aggregate on  pharmaceuticals;  that the R&D expenditure required to create 
innovative products needs an  adequate level  of profit  in  the pharmaceutical  sector; and 
that patients should have access to pharmaceuticals. Thus, freeing-up this sector will  have 
to be balanced with developments to ensure that these other legitimate objectives continue 
to be met or are met better than currently. This suggests in  particular that removing price 
controls on  all  pharmaceuticals  would  require  significantly  increased  levels of effective 
competition  within  the  market  in  order  to  ensure  continued  control  of  aggregate 
expenditure : a .free market does not imply an unre~u/ated  market. 
The public health impact of any relaxation would also need to be taken into account, such 
as the benefits - in  terms of advice  and  protection - that the consumer can  gain  from 
pharmacists.  Reforms in  this area need to be set within the wider context of improving 
the  efficiency,  cost  effectiveness  and  quality  of health  systems  more  widely.  The 
Commission  is  contributing  to  this  debate  by  studying  how  and  where  market  forces 
within health care systems can help save costs while promoting quality and access for all. 
•  Contractual policy 
Moving from  a  mechanism  whereby prices are fixed  by  public  authorities to a  dialogue 
between public authorities and enterprises could constitute an appropriate method in  order 
to  reconcile  price  liberalisation  and  cost-containment  in  the  health  care  sector.  The 
contractual framework allows for a price negotiation which takes into account the interest 
of both  industry  and  the  Member  States,  in  the  context  of multi-annual  commitments 
covering the entire turnover obtained with the pharmaceutical portfolio of the contracting 
13. company.  Such  a  contractual  policy  allows  to  progress  towards  pncmg  freedom  by 
exchanging consumption volumes which are not medically justified for greater freedom in 
respect of price determination.  Provided that it  is  in  conformity with the Treaty rules on 
free  movement of goods and  competition,  this  method,  based  on the extension  beyond 
price fixing of the scope of the discussions to a wider range of subjects (prices/volumes/ 
promotion/R&D spending/priority choices in respect of public health), involving the entire 
pharmaceutical  portfolio  could  allow  for  the  establishment  of levels  of growth  for 
pharmaceutical expenses which are compatible with the increase in the national wealth, the 
epidemiology and  the need to meet the cost of major pharmaceutical innovations. 
•  Profit control 
A profit control policy can produce similar results whilst allowing to the industry to decide 
to launch new products at the price they deem appropriate as long as the profits obtained 
are in  line with public health and  social  protection objectives.  Such system is  also based 
upon negotiations between interested parties on a level of profit which allows reasonable 
prices,  competitive  development  and  sustainable  research.  For  such  a  policy  to  be 
acceptable for all,  it  should distinguish clearly between what belongs to the health service 
and  what  belongs  to  the  private  sector,  take  into  account  the  capital  employed,  in 
particular in respect of R&D, as well as promotion expenses. 
•  De-IL-.ting and greater patient co-payment for certain products 
De-listing of  certain indications or treatment areas which are considered to be appropriate 
for self-treatment, or moving them to lower reimbursement classes, might help to achieve 
greater cost-consciousness in  the use of medicines and  thereby contribute to  savings in 
reimbursement  budgets.  Such  an  effect  might  be  strengthened  by  a  reduction  in  the 
reimbursement of products of lesser therapeutic evidence.  Clearly, a savings effect would 
only  arise  within  an  indication-based  model  of  pharmaceutical  prescribing  whereby 
pharmaceutical treatments for minor illnesses were de-listed from  reimbursement;  in  the 
absence of such a  prescribing model,  de-listing  might  simply ·result  in  the use of more 
expensive  prescription  products  to  treat  the  same  indication.  At  the  same  time, 
consideration needs to be given to the widely differing therapeutic,  economic and social 
circumstances of patients and  in  particular their need  for  access to basic products which 
can help  relieve some of the effects of long-term treatments (in  particular in  cancer and 
AIDS). 
Some consideration is  timely of the extent,  at  the  margin,  for  patients to  make greater 
contributions,  in  certain  circumstances,  to  meeting  the  costs  of  prescribed 
pharmaceuticals.  In the Commission's view, particular care is needed in  any reflections by 
Member States or industry concerning any  idea  of transferring financial  burdens to the 
patient:  the  principles  of social  solidarity  that  underpin  the  health  care systems  in  the 
Member States are an  asset to the European Union and  the consumer should expect to 
continue to benefit from such principles. 
•  Reference pricing 
Setting ceilings  or  reimbursement  levels  by  therapeutic  categories  may  help  containing 
pharmaceutical expenses.  Under such systems, social  security institutions accept to cover 
or  reimburse  the  cost  of pharmaceuticals  in  a  given  therapeutic  category  up  to  the 
reference  price,  which  is  normally  fixed  against  the  cheapest  products  in  the category, 
14. which are thus fully  reimbursed. The difference between the reference price and the actual 
price of any product in  the category can be considered as a form  of patient co-payment. 
When circumstances allow,  reference prices should be preferred to price controls, to the 
extent that they spur, rather than stifle, competition : they encourage companies to bring 
prices in line with the reference prices or justify the higher price requested, and leave it to 
the  doctor/patient  to  choose  between  a  cheaper medicine  at  no  extra  cost  or a  more 
expensive one for which a co-payment will be required. 
•  Encouraging generic competition 
The Frankfurt Round Tables has identified that a more competitive generic market has an 
important contribution to overall competition in the pharmaceutical sector.  Many of the 
measures that  are  mentioned  more generally in  this  section on specific  measures are of 
relevance to the generic sector.  However, of  particular importance to this sector are: 
•  encouraging the prescribing by doctors and the dispensing of generics by  pharmacists 
so as to stimulate consumer choice; 
•  increasing consumer awareness of  the availability of  generic medicines; 
•  ensuring that the licensing process for generic products operates speedily to ensure that 
consumers  have  access  to  lower  prices  generics  as  soon  as  possible  after  patent 
protection of  the original product expires; 
•  developing financial  mechanisms  within  the  health  care  systems  in  ways  that  favour 
price competition between generic products and originator brands. 
•  Involvement ofprescrihers 
Greater  competition  in  the  pharmaceutical  sector  requires  a  higher  involvement  of 
prescribers which  decide,  for most of the market,  both on whether a product should be 
used and, if so, which product. Mechanisms, such as prescription budgets, together with 
information about the comparative cost of products with the same therapeutic interest, can 
help to increase price sensitivity on the demand side,  which  is  a prerequisite for  a more 
competitive pharmaceutical market. 
•  Access to market 
Steps should be taken to improve the speed with  whic~ products access the market after 
they have received their marketing authorizations.  This should include an  examination -
with a view to taking any appropriate legal steps - of the reasons why licensed  products 
are not entering the market  until  long after the deadlines for  pricing and  reimbursement 
negotiations  stipulated  by  the  Transparency  Directive  (which  imply  that  pricing  and 
reimbursement negotiations should be completed within 180 days). 
There  are  also  reports  of long  delays  in  issuing  licenses  for  generic  products  in  some 
Member  States.  The  review  of the  European  licensing  system  in  2000  provides  an 
opportunity  to  consider  the  licensing  of generic  medicines  in  greater  depth  and  for 
developing the access of generic products to specific health care systems and the demand 
for generic products within those systems. 
15. •  Afarkettran~parency 
The Transparency Committee already provides an appropriate forum for Member States to 
exchange information about, and to discuss,  mechanisms that are successfully addressing 
the  issues  raised  by  the  Single  Market  in  this  sector.  This  discussion  could  usefully 
address  not  only  the  systems  for  paying  for  pharmaceuticals  but  also  the  systems  for 
pharmaceutical  distribution.  The  Transparency  Committee  also  offers  the  basis  for 
promoting  greater  transparency  of pharmaceutical  prices  (the  EudraMat  database  of 
pharmaceutical prices is now operational). 
There is a need to underpin discussions and policy-making with better empirical data than 
is currently available to the Commission and to national  regulators.  Benchmarking price 
levels and movements,  volumes,  margins and  discounting arrangements would  allow to 
develop useful economic data and  analysis for the formulation of future policies and  for 
the preparation of Enlargement. 
Work might also be undertaken on how to improve the assessment of  relative effectiveness 
of pharmaceuticals and  on  how to  exchange  that  information  between  regulators.  The 
EMEA and the European Commission Joint Research Center are currently working up a 
pilot  project  to  collate  and  make  available  electronically  summaries  of  product 
characteristics and  patient  leaflets.  The Council  has  itself noted  the  relative  absence  of 
reliable  data  in  this  area:  this  may  need  to  be  addressed,  if necessary  by  setting  out 
requirements for data disclosure in legislation. 
Whilst  there  is  a  need  for  certain  market  restrictions  to  safeguard  high  standards  of 
qualitative  and  professional  information  in  the  retail  pharmaceutical  distribution  sector, 
national bans on distance selling of non-prescribed pharmaceuticals could be re-examined 
in  the light of the principle of proportionality.  When cross-border marketing restrictions 
are  combined  with  remuneration  systems  that  favour  the  sale  of high-cost  products, 
competitive  pressures  in  the  internal  market  to  offer  the  best  value  (in  terms  of 
price/quality) pharmaceuticals and pharmacy services risk being neutralised. 
Electronic commerce and information to patients 
The pressures for change that have been identified in the Round Table process can be expected 
to fall  on all  parts of the pharmaceutical  sector,  not just the pharmaceutical  industry itself. 
The  pharmacy  service  in  many  Member  States  accounts  for  over  25%  of the  final  cost 
(excluding taxation) of a pharmaceutical. It  may be only a matter of time (and ability to enter 
the market) before new systems for delivering products to the consumer- particularly through 
the increasing possibilities of electronic commerce - cause regulators to consider what savings 
might be made in this part of  their expenditure on pharmaceuticals. 
There  are  two  key  aspects  of the  pharmaceutical  sector  that  are  likely  to  be  particularly 
affected by development of electronic commerce : the wholesaling of pharmaceuticals (where 
electronic commerce may reinforce the considerable consolidation in  the wholesaling function 
currently underway in the European Union), and, where authorised, the sale of  pharmaceuticals 
to patients (and the effects on pharmacists). Developments in these  area raise the prospect that 
the  delivery  of prescription  medicines  could  be  performed  through  electronic  commerce 
mechanisms  at  considerably  less  cost  to  the  health  care  systems  so  long  as  there  is  no 
detrimental effect on  safety:  of particular relevance  here is  the public  health implications of 
16. global trade in  pharmaceuticals in  particular where the public health interest requires medical 
supervision of  the prescribing and use of  a given product. 
A range of more general issues  can be expected to be raised by developments in the area of 
electronic commerce.  These issues notably include the prospect that advertising legally placed 
on  the  Internet  in  the  United  States  (which  allows  direct  to  consumer  advertising  of 
prescription pharmaceuticals) will be accessed in the European Union where such advertising is 
explicitly banned. The issue of direct to consumer advertising needs to be examined in  greater 
depth;.  The  context  of such  consideration,  however,  is  unlikely  to  be  simply  that  of 
advertising directly to patient;  the  wider issue of what  information  is  made available  about 
products  - especially  for  the  purposes  of independent  third  party  assessment  of relative 
effectiveness - will also need to be addressed in this context. 
Enlargement 
The issue of  the Single Market in  pharmaceutic·als is  being raised with the countries of Central 
and Eastern European in  the context of the preparations for Accessions negotiations.  A more 
developed  dialogue  between  the  current  Member  States,  the  applicant  countries  and  the 
pharmaceutical industry is  important to ensure that all  the interests in  this sector can engage 
constructively  in  the  complex  set  of issues,  relating  to  health  policy,  industrial  policy, 
competition and  market policies that  the  Single Market raises  in  this  sector.  In  particular, 
there needs to be a thorough consideration of the implications arising from  lower abilities to 
pay for pharmaceuticals given that levels of GOP per head in these countries are lower- often 
substantially lower - than the average of  the current EU-15. The Commission could, therefore, 
arrange a  dedicated  discussion  conference in  i 999 on  the pharmaceutical  market aspects of 
accession to ensure full  understanding ofthe challenges ahead. 
17. Chapter 3 
CONCLUSION  : LOOKING FORWARD 
The completion of the Single Market in  Pharmaceuticals raises a complex set of issues that do 
not lend themselves to easy solutions.  This is  an  area of direct and central relevance both to 
Europe's industrial  base  in  pharmaceuticals  and  to the financial  viability  of the  health  care 
systems on which the European citizen relies.  This Communication has  aimed to stimulate 
discussion about these issues with all  interested parties.  The approaches that are developed as 
a result of these discussions must be developed in  full  respect of the principles and priorities 
established by the EC Treaty, in a manner consistent with the principle of  subsidiarity. 
The Round Table dialogue has, in this respect, been valuable, in particular in identifying factors 
for change but also in  establishing a forum to discuss better regulation of this sector.  But, to 
be meaningful, that discussion now needs to be taken forward within clearer parameters. The 
third  Round  Table,  in  December  1998,  provides  an  opportunity  for  testing  whether  the 
interested parties can agree not only on some basic assumptions which will allow this debate to 
move forward constructively but also on a process for handling future discussions. 
The first  key  question  has  to  be  whether the  parties  to  this  discussion  can agree  a  set  of 
common objectives founded on agreed basic assumptions.  Without this,  there is  little point in 
continuing the process.  This Communication confirms the basic principle that pharmaceuticals 
should not be exempted from the Single Market because they are used in  health care systems; 
furthermore it notes that the existence of price control systems are not themselves contrary to 
the principle of free movement of goods.  Parallel trade acts as an important driving force for 
market integration where there are important differences  in  prices  between Member States. 
These differences must be addressed in a way that is consistent with the principles of  the Single 
Market  and  cannot  justify  measures  the  effect  of which  is  to  maintain  or  increase  the 
partitioning of the common market along national lines.  The aim of ensuring sufficient overall 
revenue  to  the  pharmaceutical  industry  to  allow  continued  funding  of  research  and 
development  has  to  be  considered  within  the  context  of Member  State  responsibilities  to 
promote  health  and  treat  illness  within  limited  budgets,  access  at  an  affordable  cost  for 
patients and consumers and the principles ofthe Single Market. 
The Commission  has  considered  various approaches  which  could  be pursued,  including  the 
possibility that the current situation could be left to develop, subject to adequate monitoring  and a 
fully  integrated approach  . Both these approaches have  drawbacks,  which  have been  outlined;. 
There is, however, a middle way consisting in reinforcing co-operation between Member States and 
health care service providers and introducing normal market mechanisms in market segments which 
are sufficiently suitable for convergence, whenever this can be done without compromising the 
access to medicines at an  affordable cost for patients and consumers, and the Member States' 
ability to meet public expenditure objectives . A range of specific measures can be considered in 
this context; most of them relate to the exercise of  exclusive competence of  the Member States. In 
accordance with the principle of  subsidiarity, it is therefore for the Member States to decide whether 
these measures could or should be adopted. 
The Round Table meeting in  December  1998  could be used to discuss the feasibility  of the 
various options identified  in  this Communication to build  the consensus for change - taking 
into  account  the  different  segments  of the  pharmaceutical  market,  the  need  to  encourage 
competition, and the requirement that Member States must be able to ensure the financing of 
18. their health care systems. The specific measures addressed in this Communication are intended 
to serve as the basis for advancing practical solutions. Some of  the approaches discussed in this 
Communication  are  easier  than  others.  The  focus  now  needs  to  be  on  achievable 
developments that  work  in  the  context of the existing  health  care  systems  and  the  Single 
Market. Policy development by consensus is better than trying to  .impose solutions in this area; 
however, the Treaty requires the development and maintenance of  a Single Market. 
If the interested parties wish to pursue this agenda within these parameters, the practical next 
steps might be: 
•  Discussions between the Commission and the Member States to develop ideas for greater 
reliance on market  mechanisms to  meet  regulatory objectives  and  to develop  increased 
competition in  the context of individual national health systems;  these discussions should 
complement a dialogue between the Member States and the major stakeholders,  including 
patients and  consumer associations,  to seek to identify ways of addressing these issues 
within their domestic health care systems:  these discussions might be given a greater focus 
by the agreement of action plans.  The outcome of these discussions, and the action plans, 
might be part ofthe discussions offuture Round Tables. 
•  In the light  of progress in  the  above discussions and  negotiations,  the Commission  will 
assess  whether  the  Transparency  Directive  requires  modification.  Key  parts  of that 
assessment would  concern the reasons for  delays in  launching products onto the market 
and consideration of whether the Directive needed updating to take account of evolutions 
in health care systems since the original Directive was agreed. 
•  As stated in the Commission Communication on the development of  public health policy in 
the European Community COM(1998)230, future work should  address and  promote co-
operation on  the evaluation of the therapeutic value of pharmaceuticals,  in  particular in 
comparison to alternatives, as well  as the systematic collection and analysis of data on the 
utilization of  data and brands, especially prescription and consumption patterns. 
A more developed dialogue between the current Member States, the applicant countries and 
the pharmaceutical  industry is  important to ensure that the applicant  countries can  consider 
fully  the  implications  for  their  health  care  services  of entry  into  the  Single  Market.  The 
Commission  could  ,  therefore,  arrange  a  dedicated  discussion  conference  in  1999  on  the 
pharmaceutical  market  aspects of Accession  to ensure  full  understanding  of the challenges 
ahead. 
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Merck & Co 18,475 5,541 27,9 1,487 7,5
Glaxo-Wellcome 14,284 5364 37,5 1,988 13,9
Novartis 9,110 2,911 24,0 1,711 18,8
Bristol-Myers Squibb 8,702 2,871 33,0 1,276 14,7
Hoechst Marion Roussel 8,455 1,461 17,3 1,453 17,2
Pfizer 8,188 3,090 32,1 1,522 15,8
SmithKline Beecham 8,148 2,019 24,8 1,204 14,8
American Home Products 7,924 2,770 24,5 1,100 13,9
Roche 7,808 n.a. n.a. 1,574 20,2
Rhone-Poulenc 7,686 932 12,1 1,100 14,3
Bayer Group 7,679 1,214 15,8 1,127 14,7
Johnson & Jonhson 7,188 2,477 34,5 1,093 15,2
Pharmacia & Upjohn 7,176 1,420 19,8 1,266 17,6
Eli Lilly 6,799 2 ,031 27,6 1,190 16,2
Abbott Laboratories 6,307 1,898 30,1 - -
Astra 5,657 1,773 31,3 1,024 18,1
Schering-Plough 5,050 1,606 28,4 733 13,0
Takeda 4,573 965 21,1 580 8,6
Corange 4,226 561 13,3 566 13,4
Zeneca 4,170 1,296 31,1 668 16,0
Source : Chemical Insight, Late December 1997